ce6911c196
This reverted a cutover that had actually succeeded.
The evidence, from the revert tearing it down:
dhclient: DHCPRELEASE of 87.192.101.48 on bond0.53 to 185.232.119.244
vtysh: "no ip route 0.0.0.0/0 87.192.96.1 bond0.53 tag 210 1"
netlinkd: RTM_NEWLINK -> bond0.53, mac=f0:9f:c2:12:9b:4f
bond0.53 came up with the cloned MAC and was handed 87.192.101.48 -- the exact
public address the USG holds -- with a default route via the real ISP gateway.
kea was serving live LAN clients at the same moment (10.0.0.12, 10.0.0.13,
192.168.8.28). The gateway was working.
The only failure was pppoe0: ppp@pppoe0.service exited 5/NOTINSTALLED. That is
the Vodafone FAILOVER line, and the health check listed "pppoe0 has an address"
as mandatory, so a working gateway was torn down because its backup WAN was
down. The check encoded "every WAN must work" when the requirement is "the box
must reach the internet".
Now: default route, reachability and DNS are mandatory; each WAN interface is
reported individually but fatal on neither. A failover line being down is worth
seeing, not worth reverting for.
This also incidentally settles the last genuine unknown in the migration, which
could not be tested any other way: the ISP does hand the same lease to the
cloned MAC. That was the one thing I had said was unknowable until the USG let
go of it.
Note the earlier polling fix (54b21fa) addressed a real weakness but not this
failure -- no amount of waiting would have satisfied a check that required a
line which was never going to come up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
12 KiB
Executable File
12 KiB
Executable File