P1 — thread reads now enforce ownership
========================================
chat.service.ts / routes/agent-chat.ts
GET /api/v1/threads/:id/messages was previously RBAC-mapped to
view:agents (no resourceName scope) with the route comment promising
"service-level owner check enforces fine-grained access" — but the
service didn't actually check. Any caller with view:agents could read
another user's thread by guessing/learning the threadId. CUIDs are
hard to brute-force but they leak: SSE `final` chunks, agents-plugin
`_meta.threadId`, and several response bodies surface them. Now
ChatService.listMessages(threadId, ownerId) loads the thread, returns
404 (not 403, to avoid id-enumeration via differential status codes)
if ownerId doesn't match. Regression test in chat-service.test.ts
covers Alice/Bob isolation + nonexistent-thread same-shape 404.
P2 — AgentChatRequestSchema strict mode
========================================
validation/agent.schema.ts
`.merge()` does NOT inherit `.strict()` from AgentChatParamsSchema.
Typo'd fields (e.g. `temprature`) silently fell through and the agent
silently used the default — debuggable only by reading the LLM call
payload. Re-applied `.strict()` on the merged schema.
P2 — per-agent maxIterations override + clamp
==============================================
chat.service.ts
Loop cap was a hard-coded module constant (12), wrong for both
research-style agents (need higher) and cheap-probe agents (could opt
lower). Now reads `agent.extras.maxIterations`, clamps 1..50, falls
back to 12 default. The clamp is the soft-DoS guard: a hostile agent
definition with `maxIterations:1000000` can't burn unbounded LLM calls
per request. Both chat() and chatStream() use ctx.maxIterations now.
Regression test covers low-cap override (rejects with `exceeded 2`)
and hostile-value clamp (rejects with `exceeded 50`).
P3 — SSE write to closed socket
================================
routes/agent-chat.ts
When the upstream adapter throws after some chunks were already
written AND the client disconnected, the catch block tried to flush
more chunks to a closed socket. Without an `on('error')` handler
Node emits unhandled error events; once Pino is wired to alerts
this'd page on every disconnect-mid-stream. writeSseChunk now
checks `reply.raw.destroyed || writableEnded` before write.
P3 — BACKEND_TOKEN_DEAD preserves original stack
=================================================
services/secret-backend-rotator.service.ts
When wrapping mintRoleToken/lookupSelf failures as
BACKEND_TOKEN_DEAD, the new Error() discarded the original throw —
hard to tell whether the inner failure was a network blip vs an
OpenBao API mismatch vs DNS. Now uses `new Error(msg, { cause: err })`
so the inner stack survives.
P3 — .gitignore .claude/scheduled_tasks.lock
=============================================
This persisted state file was leaking into every `git status`.
Tests
=====
mcpd 761/761 (+2 regression tests). mcplocal 715/715. cli 430/430.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Comprehensive MCP server management with kubectl-style CLI.
Key features in this release:
- Declarative YAML apply/get round-trip with project cloning support
- Gated sessions with prompt intelligence for Claude
- Interactive MCP console with traffic inspector
- Persistent STDIO connections for containerized servers
- RBAC with name-scoped bindings
- Shell completions (fish + bash) auto-generated
- Rate-limit retry with exponential backoff in apply
- Project-scoped prompt management
- Credential scrubbing from git history
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce a Helm-chart-like template system for MCP servers. Templates are
YAML files in templates/ that get seeded into the DB on startup. Users can
browse them with `mcpctl get templates`, inspect with `mcpctl describe
template`, and instantiate with `mcpctl create server --from-template=`.
Also adds Portainer deployment scripts, mcplocal systemd service,
Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint, and RPM packaging for mcpctl-local.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
