mcpctl/src/mcpd/tests/injector-manifest.test.ts

/**
 * Injector manifest generation.
 *
 * The two things that must not break: a server NOT opted in produces a
 * byte-identical manifest to before, and a rendered secret value survives the
 * shell intact whatever it contains. The second is the subtle one — bad quoting
 * fails silently, yielding an empty token and a server that reports healthy
 * while every authenticated call fails.
 */
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { writeFileSync, mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import {
  generatePodSpec,
  buildInjectorAnnotations,
  wrapCommandForInjector,
  shellSingleQuote,
} from '../src/services/k8s/manifest-generator.js';
import type { ContainerSpec } from '../src/services/orchestrator.js';

const BASE: ContainerSpec = { name: 'gitea', image: 'gitea/mcp:latest' } as ContainerSpec;
const CFG = { role: 'mcpctl-server-gitea', authPath: 'auth/kubernetes-worker0', mount: 'secret', pathPrefix: 'mcpctl' };

describe('generatePodSpec — opted-out servers are untouched', () => {
  it('emits no annotations, no serviceAccountName, automount still false', () => {
    const pod = generatePodSpec({ ...BASE, env: { TOKEN: 'plain' } } as ContainerSpec, 'mcpctl-servers');
    expect(pod.metadata.annotations).toBeUndefined();
    expect(pod.spec.serviceAccountName).toBeUndefined();
    expect(pod.spec.automountServiceAccountToken).toBe(false);
    expect(pod.spec.containers[0]?.env).toEqual([{ name: 'TOKEN', value: 'plain' }]);
  });
});

describe('generatePodSpec — opted-in servers', () => {
  const spec = {
    ...BASE,
    annotations: buildInjectorAnnotations(
      [{ name: 'GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN', secretName: 'gitea-creds', key: 'GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN' }],
      CFG,
    ),
    serviceAccountName: 'mcpctl-server-gitea',
    automountServiceAccountToken: true,
  } as ContainerSpec;

  it('carries no secret VALUE anywhere in the manifest', () => {
    const pod = generatePodSpec(spec, 'mcpctl-servers');
    const json = JSON.stringify(pod);
    expect(json).not.toContain('de4c69ed');
    expect(pod.spec.containers[0]?.env ?? []).toEqual([]);
  });

  it('runs as its own ServiceAccount with the SA token projected', () => {
    const pod = generatePodSpec(spec, 'mcpctl-servers');
    expect(pod.spec.serviceAccountName).toBe('mcpctl-server-gitea');
    // The agent cannot log in without it; false here is a silent crashloop.
    expect(pod.spec.automountServiceAccountToken).toBe(true);
  });

  it('pins the auth path to the mount that validates THIS cluster', () => {
    const a = buildInjectorAnnotations([{ name: 'T', secretName: 's', key: 'k' }], CFG);
    expect(a['vault.hashicorp.com/auth-path']).toBe('auth/kubernetes-worker0');
    expect(a['vault.hashicorp.com/role']).toBe('mcpctl-server-gitea');
    // init container only — no sidecar in a 512Mi pod
    expect(a['vault.hashicorp.com/agent-pre-populate-only']).toBe('true');
  });

  it('groups env vars by the secret they come from', () => {
    const a = buildInjectorAnnotations([
      { name: 'HOST', secretName: 'gitea-creds', key: 'GITEA_HOST' },
      { name: 'TOKEN', secretName: 'gitea-creds', key: 'GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN' },
      { name: 'OTHER', secretName: 'other-creds', key: 'K' },
    ], CFG);
    expect(a['vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-gitea-creds']).toBe('secret/data/mcpctl/gitea-creds');
    expect(a['vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-other-creds']).toBe('secret/data/mcpctl/other-creds');
    const tpl = a['vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-gitea-creds'] ?? '';
    expect(tpl).toContain('export HOST=');
    expect(tpl).toContain('export TOKEN=');
    expect(tpl).not.toContain('export OTHER=');
  });

  it('is stable under input reordering', () => {
    const refs = [
      { name: 'B', secretName: 'z', key: 'k' },
      { name: 'A', secretName: 'a', key: 'k' },
    ];
    expect(buildInjectorAnnotations(refs, CFG)).toEqual(buildInjectorAnnotations([...refs].reverse(), CFG));
  });
});

describe('wrapCommandForInjector', () => {
  it('preserves argv exactly via $0/$@ and execs so PID 1 is the real process', () => {
    // exec matters: mcpd attaches to PID 1 stdin/stdout for STDIO servers.
    const cmd = wrapCommandForInjector(['node', 'server.js', '--port', '3000'], ['a-creds']);
    expect(cmd[0]).toBe('/bin/sh');
    expect(cmd[1]).toBe('-c');
    expect(cmd[2]).toContain('exec "$0" "$@"');
    expect(cmd.slice(3)).toEqual(['node', 'server.js', '--port', '3000']);
  });

  it('sources every referenced secret file, in a stable order', () => {
    const cmd = wrapCommandForInjector(['x'], ['b-creds', 'a-creds']);
    expect(cmd[2]).toBe('. /vault/secrets/a-creds; . /vault/secrets/b-creds; exec "$0" "$@"');
  });
});

describe('shell quoting survives adversarial values', () => {
  // Executed by a real /bin/sh: asserting on the string alone would prove
  // nothing about what the shell actually does with it.
  const nasty = [
    'plain',
    'with space',
    "single'quote",
    'double"quote',
    '$USER and `whoami`',
    'semi;colon && rm -rf /',
    'new\nline',
    'back\\slash',
    "'; export PWNED=1; '",
  ];

  it.each(nasty)('round-trips %j through a sourced file', (value) => {
    const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mcpctl-quote-'));
    const file = join(dir, 'env');
    writeFileSync(file, `export SECRET=${shellSingleQuote(value)}\n`);
    const out = execFileSync('/bin/sh', ['-c', `. ${file}; printf '%s' "$SECRET"`], { encoding: 'utf-8' });
    expect(out).toBe(value);
  });

  it('does not let a crafted value execute anything', () => {
    const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mcpctl-quote-'));
    const file = join(dir, 'env');
    writeFileSync(file, `export SECRET=${shellSingleQuote("'; touch /tmp/mcpctl-pwned; '")}\n`);
    const out = execFileSync('/bin/sh', ['-c', `. ${file}; printf '%s' "$PWNED_MARKER"`], { encoding: 'utf-8' });
    expect(out).toBe('');
  });
});