vyos: a failover you can actually trigger, and four bugs found triggering it
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A planned failover had no reliable lever. VyOS offers only `restart vrrp`, and
neither that nor `systemctl restart keepalived` is dependable: with advert_int 1
the peer declares the master dead after ~3.6s and a restart usually finishes
inside that window. Measured -- the same command moved mastership on one run and
not on the next three. A fail-back step you cannot trigger on purpose is not a
procedure, and the recovery card depended on one.

The lever is now `touch /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault`: the health check fails, the
sync group sheds every VIP, and the peer takes over. It exercises the same path
a real WAN loss takes rather than a special case, and it lives in /run so a
reboot cannot leave a router permanently ineligible.

Proven end to end in labsim: lever -> mastership moves -> WAN follows -> the old
master releases -> a LAN VM has internet -> the faulted router returns to BACKUP
and is eligible again.

Getting there exposed four real bugs, two of which would have broken a GENUINE
failover, not just the drill:

  - The grace stamp was written only by the 30s reconciler, so a freshly
    promoted master reached the 5s health check with no stamp, scored grace = 0,
    failed instantly and went FAULT. With the peer already faulted that left
    BOTH routers in FAULT and the LAN with no gateway at all -- worse than the
    outage the check exists to prevent. The check now stamps on promotion.
  - And it inherited STALE stamps from an earlier mastership, failing ~5s after
    passing. The stamp is now cleared on the way down, by the health check
    itself, not only by the reconciler.
  - The lock fd leaked into VyOS's config session: `exec 9>` is inherited by the
    long-lived unionfs-fuse the session spawns, which never closes it. From the
    first config change on, every later reconciler run lost the flock and exited
    0 having done nothing -- healthy-looking journal, silently stopped
    reconciling. That is how a demoted router kept the WAN. Children now get 9>&-.
  - vrrp-wan-apply touched pppoe0 unconditionally. On a box where pppoe0 has no
    source-interface VyOS rejects the whole commit ("Physical source-interface
    required"), taking the bond0.53 change down with it -- and the script still
    returned 0, so the reconciler logged a release that never happened. pppoe0 is
    now guarded on existence and the commit's verdict is propagated.

Still NOT applied to production. The pair is single-homed on WAN until it is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
This commit is contained in:
Michal
2026-09-02 23:27:17 +01:00
parent 7bf3f42e19
commit 2e828b8af2
3 changed files with 75 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@@ -17,16 +17,32 @@ WAN_VIF=53
cfg() { /opt/vyatta/bin/vyatta-op-cmd-wrapper show configuration commands 2>/dev/null; }
wan_disabled(){ cfg | grep -q "vif ${WAN_VIF} disable"; }
ppp_disabled(){ cfg | grep -q "pppoe pppoe0 disable"; }
# Only touch pppoe0 if it is actually configured. `set interfaces pppoe pppoe0
# disable` on a box that has no pppoe0 CREATES the node with nothing but
# `disable`, and VyOS then refuses the commit with "Physical source-interface
# required for pppoe0!" -- taking the bond0.53 change down with it, because one
# invalid node fails the whole commit. Seen on the labsim secondary, which has
# no PPPoE; production has it on both, so this would have been an untested path
# that only ever ran during a failover.
ppp_exists(){ cfg | grep -q "pppoe pppoe0 source-interface"; }
configure
if [ "$MODE" = enable ]; then
# Guarded: `delete` of an absent node aborts the whole batch with
# "Nothing to delete", which left the box detected-but-unfixed.
wan_disabled && delete interfaces bonding bond0 vif ${WAN_VIF} disable
ppp_disabled && delete interfaces pppoe pppoe0 disable
ppp_exists && ppp_disabled && delete interfaces pppoe pppoe0 disable
else
wan_disabled || set interfaces bonding bond0 vif ${WAN_VIF} disable
ppp_disabled || set interfaces pppoe pppoe0 disable
ppp_exists && { ppp_disabled || set interfaces pppoe pppoe0 disable; }
fi
# Report the commit's verdict. The script previously ended on `exit` (a
# script-template function) and returned 0 even after "Commit failed", so the
# reconciler logged a successful release that had not happened -- the worst kind
# of failure for something whose whole job is to keep two routers from holding
# one WAN.
if commit 2>&1 | tee /tmp/vrrp-wan-commit.log | grep -qi "commit failed"; then
logger -t vrrp-wan "COMMIT FAILED applying '$MODE' -- see /tmp/vrrp-wan-commit.log"
exit 1
fi
commit
exit

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@@ -32,6 +32,28 @@ STATE=/run/vrrp-wan
GRACE=90 # seconds a new master gets to complete DHCP / PPPoE dial-up
VIP="${VRRP_WAN_VIP:-192.168.1.1}"
# A deliberate hand-over lever.
#
# There is no reliable way to MAKE this pair fail over on demand. VyOS offers
# only `restart vrrp`, and neither that nor `systemctl restart keepalived` is
# dependable: with advert_int 1 the peer declares the master dead after ~3.6s,
# and a restart usually finishes inside that window. Measured in labsim -- the
# same command moved mastership on one run and not on the next three. A
# fail-back procedure you cannot trigger on purpose is not a procedure.
#
# Failing the health check IS the supported way to shed mastership: the sync
# group goes FAULT, releases every VIP, and the peer takes over -- the same path
# a genuine WAN loss takes, so the planned drill exercises the real mechanism
# rather than a special case.
#
# touch /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault hand over within failure-count*interval
# rm /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault become eligible again (no-preempt keeps
# it BACKUP until the peer hands back)
#
# It lives in /run deliberately: a reboot clears it, so a forgotten drill cannot
# leave a router permanently ineligible.
[ -f /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault ] && exit 1
# Am I holding the VIPs? Asked of REALITY -- is the management VIP actually on
# this box -- and not of a /run marker.
#
@@ -42,7 +64,30 @@ VIP="${VRRP_WAN_VIP:-192.168.1.1}"
# backup, passed this check, and sat holding every VIP with no WAN -- the exact
# outage this script exists to prevent, re-created by trusting the reporter
# instead of the fact.
[ -n "$(ip -4 -o addr show 2>/dev/null | grep " ${VIP}/")" ] || exit 0
if [ -z "$(ip -4 -o addr show 2>/dev/null | grep " ${VIP}/")" ]; then
# Clear the grace stamp on the way down, HERE, not only in the reconciler.
# The reconciler runs every 30s; this runs every 5s. A promotion that
# inherited a stamp from an earlier mastership scored grace = hours, failed
# immediately, and took the sync group to FAULT ~5s after passing -- with the
# peer already faulted, that left BOTH routers in FAULT and the LAN with no
# gateway. The stamp must belong to the CURRENT mastership or it is worse
# than useless.
rm -f "$STATE/since" 2>/dev/null
exit 0
fi
# Start the grace clock HERE, the moment mastership is first observed.
#
# It used to be stamped only by vrrp-wan-reconcile, which runs on a 30s timer --
# so a freshly promoted master reached this check with no stamp, scored grace=0,
# failed, and went FAULT before it had any chance to bring the WAN up. The peer
# then found itself alone with no WAN either and did the same. Observed in
# labsim: BOTH routers in FAULT, nobody holding the VIPs, the LAN with no
# gateway at all. That is worse than the outage this script exists to prevent,
# and it would have hit a REAL failover, not just a drill -- the health check
# runs every 5s and the reconciler had not yet ticked.
mkdir -p "$STATE" 2>/dev/null
[ -f "$STATE/since" ] || date +%s > "$STATE/since"
# Master with an address on a WAN interface: healthy.
#

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@ fi
# One writer. The 30s timer and a VRRP transition can fire together, and two
# VyOS commits in flight on one box do not queue -- the second fails outright.
#
# The lock fd MUST be closed for children (`9>&-` on every call below). Entering
# VyOS config mode spawns a long-lived unionfs-fuse for the session, and it
# INHERITS this descriptor and never lets go -- `lsof /run/vrrp-wan.lock` showed
# it held by unionfs-fuse with fd 9w. From the first config change onward every
# later run lost the flock and exited 0 without doing anything, so the
# reconciler looked healthy in the journal ("Finished") while quietly having
# stopped reconciling. It is how a demoted router kept the WAN.
exec 9>"$LOCK"
flock -n 9 || exit 0
@@ -85,7 +93,7 @@ if holds_vip; then
[ -f "$STATE/since" ] || date +%s > "$STATE/since"
wan_disabled || ppp_disabled || exit 0
logger -t vrrp-wan "MASTER with WAN disabled -> enabling bond0.${WAN_VIF} + pppoe0"
"$APPLY" enable
"$APPLY" enable 9>&-
else
echo backup > "$STATE/role"
rm -f "$STATE/since"
@@ -95,7 +103,7 @@ else
# new master, and the switch sends the ISP's replies to whichever port spoke
# last -- the WAN-side twin of the eth2 incident.
logger -t vrrp-wan "not MASTER but WAN enabled -> releasing bond0.${WAN_VIF} + pppoe0"
"$APPLY" disable
"$APPLY" disable 9>&-
fi
# Deliberately no `save`. config.boot keeps `disable` on BOTH routers, so a