vyos: VRRP health check so the WAN and the gateway VIP cannot separate
Outage of 2026-09-02: vyos002 held every floating gateway IP while vyos001 held
the only working WAN. The LAN had a gateway that could not reach the internet,
and it stayed that way until vyos002 was powered off by hand.
Three causes, none of them bad luck. VRRP had no health check of any kind, so
mastership was decided purely on whether the peer was still advertising and
never on whether this router could route. vyos002 structurally cannot route --
bond0.53 is `disable`d because the 10 gig lease is bound to a cloned MAC that
only one box may hold, and pppoe0 is not up. And `no-preempt` is set on every
group, so once vyos002 took master it kept it even with a healthy priority-200
peer sitting next to it.
Reproduced exactly in labsim: stopping keepalived on the primary moved every VIP
to the WAN-less secondary and LAN internet went from 9ms to 100% loss; restarting
the healthy primary left it BACKUP and the outage in place. Applying this check
self-healed it -- secondary to FAULT, primary to MASTER, internet back.
The check asks "do I have an address on a WAN interface", deliberately not "can
I reach the internet" and not "do I have a default route". During a real ISP
outage the default route disappears on BOTH routers; keying on that would put
both in FAULT, nobody would hold the VIPs, and an internet outage would become a
total one.
Config goes on the SYNC GROUP, not per group: VyOS refuses a per-group check
while the group is in a sync group ("Only sync group health check will be
used"), and sync-group scope is what we want anyway so all VIPs move together.
Known cost, measured: with the primary genuinely dead the secondary stays FAULT
and NOTHING holds the gateway, so inter-VLAN routing stops too. That is the
honest consequence of a backup that cannot route. The fix for it is to make the
WAN follow mastership so the backup CAN route -- next, and rehearsed separately,
since it is the one change that can lose the DHCP lease.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 11:39:44 +01:00
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#!/bin/sh
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# VRRP health check: may THIS router hold the floating IPs?
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#
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# It may only if it can actually carry the WAN. Without this, VRRP decides
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# mastership purely on whether the peer is still advertising -- so a router with
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# no WAN at all happily takes the VIPs and blackholes the entire LAN's internet
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# while looking perfectly healthy. That is not hypothetical: it is the outage of
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# 2026-09-02, reproduced in labsim.
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#
|
vyos: WAN follows VRRP mastership, rehearsed in labsim
The ISP is consumer with one static IP, so "both routers hold WAN" is not
available: the 10 gig lease is anchored to a cloned MAC and the PPPoE line to a
single credential. The WAN therefore has to move with mastership.
Proven end to end in the sim: the secondary was promoted, took the WAN, got a
lease, installed a default route, and a LAN VM reached the internet through it
(3/3, 9ms). Demoting released it -- link down, no address. Rebooting the master
converged correctly too: it came back BACKUP with the WAN disabled while the
peer kept it.
The rehearsal earned its keep four times over, and none of these were visible
from reading the docs:
- `transition-script` alone is NOT safe to hang internet on. VyOS delivers it
through keepalived-fifo.py, and on one promotion that helper logged NOTHING
while Keepalived_vrrp logged all six instances entering MASTER and the
built-in notify_master for conntrack-sync ran normally. The result was a
router holding every VIP with no WAN -- the 2026-09-02 outage, recreated by
the mechanism meant to prevent it. Hence vrrp-wan-reconcile on a 30s timer:
the scripts give speed, the timer gives correctness.
- The health check must ask REALITY, not a marker. Keying "am I master" on a
/run file written by the transition script meant that when the script did
not run, the router believed it was backup, passed the check, and kept the
VIPs it could not serve. It now asks whether the VIP is actually on the box.
- The old address-based check DEADLOCKED this design: may-I-be-master required
already having WAN, and only the master gets WAN. That is why vyos002 sat in
FAULT for ever -- the safety check had silently removed the redundancy it
existed to protect.
- script-template must be the FIRST thing a script does. Sourced after an if,
an exec and a mkdir it terminated the script inside the source, rc=0, no
output: the reconciler reported success having done nothing. Hence the split
into vrrp-wan-apply, matching the shape /config/vyos-known-good already uses.
Two hazards found and handled rather than discovered in production:
- A `configure` session whose process dies leaks a unionfs mount under
/opt/vyatta/config/tmp, and one of those holds the commit lock -- after
which every commit fails, including the manual one you try to fix it with.
A 30s job that can leak one per failure wedges the box on its own, so the
reconciler reaps dead sessions before it starts. It cleared 8 on the sim.
- Any `save` while a box is master persists the enabled WAN into config.boot,
so a reboot would claim the shared MAC regardless of VRRP state. Observed:
an ordinary console-apply did exactly this. config.boot must keep `disable`
on BOTH routers; the model asserts it and vyos:verify reports it as drift.
NOT yet applied to production, and it should not be until the remaining item is
settled: a clean, deliberately-triggered failover has been seen via reboot, but
`restart vrrp` twice failed to move mastership at all, so the trigger for a
planned failover is still unproven.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 18:02:58 +01:00
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# The first version of this script asked one question: "do I have an address on
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# a WAN interface". That is correct for a pair where both routers hold WAN all
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# the time. Ours cannot: the 10 gig lease is bound to a cloned MAC and the
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# PPPoE line to a single credential, so the WAN follows mastership (see
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# vrrp-wan-take). Against that design the old check DEADLOCKS --
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#
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# may I be master? -> only if I already have WAN
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# do I have WAN? -> only if I am master
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#
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# -- and the backup sits in FAULT for ever. vyos002 sat exactly there, which
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# meant the pair could not fail over at all: the safety check had quietly
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# removed the redundancy it was protecting.
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#
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# So the question is now asked in the right order: enforce "must have WAN" only
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# on the router that is actually HOLDING the VIPs, and give a new master time to
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# bring the WAN up before judging it.
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|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
vyos: VRRP health check so the WAN and the gateway VIP cannot separate
Outage of 2026-09-02: vyos002 held every floating gateway IP while vyos001 held
the only working WAN. The LAN had a gateway that could not reach the internet,
and it stayed that way until vyos002 was powered off by hand.
Three causes, none of them bad luck. VRRP had no health check of any kind, so
mastership was decided purely on whether the peer was still advertising and
never on whether this router could route. vyos002 structurally cannot route --
bond0.53 is `disable`d because the 10 gig lease is bound to a cloned MAC that
only one box may hold, and pppoe0 is not up. And `no-preempt` is set on every
group, so once vyos002 took master it kept it even with a healthy priority-200
peer sitting next to it.
Reproduced exactly in labsim: stopping keepalived on the primary moved every VIP
to the WAN-less secondary and LAN internet went from 9ms to 100% loss; restarting
the healthy primary left it BACKUP and the outage in place. Applying this check
self-healed it -- secondary to FAULT, primary to MASTER, internet back.
The check asks "do I have an address on a WAN interface", deliberately not "can
I reach the internet" and not "do I have a default route". During a real ISP
outage the default route disappears on BOTH routers; keying on that would put
both in FAULT, nobody would hold the VIPs, and an internet outage would become a
total one.
Config goes on the SYNC GROUP, not per group: VyOS refuses a per-group check
while the group is in a sync group ("Only sync group health check will be
used"), and sync-group scope is what we want anyway so all VIPs move together.
Known cost, measured: with the primary genuinely dead the secondary stays FAULT
and NOTHING holds the gateway, so inter-VLAN routing stops too. That is the
honest consequence of a backup that cannot route. The fix for it is to make the
WAN follow mastership so the backup CAN route -- next, and rehearsed separately,
since it is the one change that can lose the DHCP lease.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 11:39:44 +01:00
|
|
|
#
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|
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|
# exit 0 = eligible for MASTER, non-zero = release and let the peer have it.
|
vyos: WAN follows VRRP mastership, rehearsed in labsim
The ISP is consumer with one static IP, so "both routers hold WAN" is not
available: the 10 gig lease is anchored to a cloned MAC and the PPPoE line to a
single credential. The WAN therefore has to move with mastership.
Proven end to end in the sim: the secondary was promoted, took the WAN, got a
lease, installed a default route, and a LAN VM reached the internet through it
(3/3, 9ms). Demoting released it -- link down, no address. Rebooting the master
converged correctly too: it came back BACKUP with the WAN disabled while the
peer kept it.
The rehearsal earned its keep four times over, and none of these were visible
from reading the docs:
- `transition-script` alone is NOT safe to hang internet on. VyOS delivers it
through keepalived-fifo.py, and on one promotion that helper logged NOTHING
while Keepalived_vrrp logged all six instances entering MASTER and the
built-in notify_master for conntrack-sync ran normally. The result was a
router holding every VIP with no WAN -- the 2026-09-02 outage, recreated by
the mechanism meant to prevent it. Hence vrrp-wan-reconcile on a 30s timer:
the scripts give speed, the timer gives correctness.
- The health check must ask REALITY, not a marker. Keying "am I master" on a
/run file written by the transition script meant that when the script did
not run, the router believed it was backup, passed the check, and kept the
VIPs it could not serve. It now asks whether the VIP is actually on the box.
- The old address-based check DEADLOCKED this design: may-I-be-master required
already having WAN, and only the master gets WAN. That is why vyos002 sat in
FAULT for ever -- the safety check had silently removed the redundancy it
existed to protect.
- script-template must be the FIRST thing a script does. Sourced after an if,
an exec and a mkdir it terminated the script inside the source, rc=0, no
output: the reconciler reported success having done nothing. Hence the split
into vrrp-wan-apply, matching the shape /config/vyos-known-good already uses.
Two hazards found and handled rather than discovered in production:
- A `configure` session whose process dies leaks a unionfs mount under
/opt/vyatta/config/tmp, and one of those holds the commit lock -- after
which every commit fails, including the manual one you try to fix it with.
A 30s job that can leak one per failure wedges the box on its own, so the
reconciler reaps dead sessions before it starts. It cleared 8 on the sim.
- Any `save` while a box is master persists the enabled WAN into config.boot,
so a reboot would claim the shared MAC regardless of VRRP state. Observed:
an ordinary console-apply did exactly this. config.boot must keep `disable`
on BOTH routers; the model asserts it and vyos:verify reports it as drift.
NOT yet applied to production, and it should not be until the remaining item is
settled: a clean, deliberately-triggered failover has been seen via reboot, but
`restart vrrp` twice failed to move mastership at all, so the trigger for a
planned failover is still unproven.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 18:02:58 +01:00
|
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STATE=/run/vrrp-wan
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GRACE=90 # seconds a new master gets to complete DHCP / PPPoE dial-up
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VIP="${VRRP_WAN_VIP:-192.168.1.1}"
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|
vyos: a failover you can actually trigger, and four bugs found triggering it
A planned failover had no reliable lever. VyOS offers only `restart vrrp`, and
neither that nor `systemctl restart keepalived` is dependable: with advert_int 1
the peer declares the master dead after ~3.6s and a restart usually finishes
inside that window. Measured -- the same command moved mastership on one run and
not on the next three. A fail-back step you cannot trigger on purpose is not a
procedure, and the recovery card depended on one.
The lever is now `touch /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault`: the health check fails, the
sync group sheds every VIP, and the peer takes over. It exercises the same path
a real WAN loss takes rather than a special case, and it lives in /run so a
reboot cannot leave a router permanently ineligible.
Proven end to end in labsim: lever -> mastership moves -> WAN follows -> the old
master releases -> a LAN VM has internet -> the faulted router returns to BACKUP
and is eligible again.
Getting there exposed four real bugs, two of which would have broken a GENUINE
failover, not just the drill:
- The grace stamp was written only by the 30s reconciler, so a freshly
promoted master reached the 5s health check with no stamp, scored grace = 0,
failed instantly and went FAULT. With the peer already faulted that left
BOTH routers in FAULT and the LAN with no gateway at all -- worse than the
outage the check exists to prevent. The check now stamps on promotion.
- And it inherited STALE stamps from an earlier mastership, failing ~5s after
passing. The stamp is now cleared on the way down, by the health check
itself, not only by the reconciler.
- The lock fd leaked into VyOS's config session: `exec 9>` is inherited by the
long-lived unionfs-fuse the session spawns, which never closes it. From the
first config change on, every later reconciler run lost the flock and exited
0 having done nothing -- healthy-looking journal, silently stopped
reconciling. That is how a demoted router kept the WAN. Children now get 9>&-.
- vrrp-wan-apply touched pppoe0 unconditionally. On a box where pppoe0 has no
source-interface VyOS rejects the whole commit ("Physical source-interface
required"), taking the bond0.53 change down with it -- and the script still
returned 0, so the reconciler logged a release that never happened. pppoe0 is
now guarded on existence and the commit's verdict is propagated.
Still NOT applied to production. The pair is single-homed on WAN until it is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 23:27:17 +01:00
|
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|
# A deliberate hand-over lever.
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#
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# There is no reliable way to MAKE this pair fail over on demand. VyOS offers
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# only `restart vrrp`, and neither that nor `systemctl restart keepalived` is
|
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|
|
# dependable: with advert_int 1 the peer declares the master dead after ~3.6s,
|
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|
|
# and a restart usually finishes inside that window. Measured in labsim -- the
|
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|
|
# same command moved mastership on one run and not on the next three. A
|
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|
|
|
# fail-back procedure you cannot trigger on purpose is not a procedure.
|
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|
#
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# Failing the health check IS the supported way to shed mastership: the sync
|
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# group goes FAULT, releases every VIP, and the peer takes over -- the same path
|
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# a genuine WAN loss takes, so the planned drill exercises the real mechanism
|
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|
# rather than a special case.
|
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#
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# touch /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault hand over within failure-count*interval
|
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# rm /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault become eligible again (no-preempt keeps
|
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|
# it BACKUP until the peer hands back)
|
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|
|
|
#
|
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|
|
|
# It lives in /run deliberately: a reboot clears it, so a forgotten drill cannot
|
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|
|
# leave a router permanently ineligible.
|
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|
[ -f /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault ] && exit 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
vyos: WAN follows VRRP mastership, rehearsed in labsim
The ISP is consumer with one static IP, so "both routers hold WAN" is not
available: the 10 gig lease is anchored to a cloned MAC and the PPPoE line to a
single credential. The WAN therefore has to move with mastership.
Proven end to end in the sim: the secondary was promoted, took the WAN, got a
lease, installed a default route, and a LAN VM reached the internet through it
(3/3, 9ms). Demoting released it -- link down, no address. Rebooting the master
converged correctly too: it came back BACKUP with the WAN disabled while the
peer kept it.
The rehearsal earned its keep four times over, and none of these were visible
from reading the docs:
- `transition-script` alone is NOT safe to hang internet on. VyOS delivers it
through keepalived-fifo.py, and on one promotion that helper logged NOTHING
while Keepalived_vrrp logged all six instances entering MASTER and the
built-in notify_master for conntrack-sync ran normally. The result was a
router holding every VIP with no WAN -- the 2026-09-02 outage, recreated by
the mechanism meant to prevent it. Hence vrrp-wan-reconcile on a 30s timer:
the scripts give speed, the timer gives correctness.
- The health check must ask REALITY, not a marker. Keying "am I master" on a
/run file written by the transition script meant that when the script did
not run, the router believed it was backup, passed the check, and kept the
VIPs it could not serve. It now asks whether the VIP is actually on the box.
- The old address-based check DEADLOCKED this design: may-I-be-master required
already having WAN, and only the master gets WAN. That is why vyos002 sat in
FAULT for ever -- the safety check had silently removed the redundancy it
existed to protect.
- script-template must be the FIRST thing a script does. Sourced after an if,
an exec and a mkdir it terminated the script inside the source, rc=0, no
output: the reconciler reported success having done nothing. Hence the split
into vrrp-wan-apply, matching the shape /config/vyos-known-good already uses.
Two hazards found and handled rather than discovered in production:
- A `configure` session whose process dies leaks a unionfs mount under
/opt/vyatta/config/tmp, and one of those holds the commit lock -- after
which every commit fails, including the manual one you try to fix it with.
A 30s job that can leak one per failure wedges the box on its own, so the
reconciler reaps dead sessions before it starts. It cleared 8 on the sim.
- Any `save` while a box is master persists the enabled WAN into config.boot,
so a reboot would claim the shared MAC regardless of VRRP state. Observed:
an ordinary console-apply did exactly this. config.boot must keep `disable`
on BOTH routers; the model asserts it and vyos:verify reports it as drift.
NOT yet applied to production, and it should not be until the remaining item is
settled: a clean, deliberately-triggered failover has been seen via reboot, but
`restart vrrp` twice failed to move mastership at all, so the trigger for a
planned failover is still unproven.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 18:02:58 +01:00
|
|
|
# Am I holding the VIPs? Asked of REALITY -- is the management VIP actually on
|
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|
|
# this box -- and not of a /run marker.
|
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|
|
#
|
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|
|
|
# The marker was the first design and it is unsafe: it is written by the VRRP
|
|
|
|
|
# transition script, and in labsim that script silently failed to run on a
|
|
|
|
|
# promotion (VyOS's keepalived-fifo.py helper stopped delivering while
|
|
|
|
|
# keepalived's own notifies kept working). The router then believed it was
|
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|
|
|
# backup, passed this check, and sat holding every VIP with no WAN -- the exact
|
|
|
|
|
# outage this script exists to prevent, re-created by trusting the reporter
|
|
|
|
|
# instead of the fact.
|
vyos: a failover you can actually trigger, and four bugs found triggering it
A planned failover had no reliable lever. VyOS offers only `restart vrrp`, and
neither that nor `systemctl restart keepalived` is dependable: with advert_int 1
the peer declares the master dead after ~3.6s and a restart usually finishes
inside that window. Measured -- the same command moved mastership on one run and
not on the next three. A fail-back step you cannot trigger on purpose is not a
procedure, and the recovery card depended on one.
The lever is now `touch /run/vrrp-wan/force-fault`: the health check fails, the
sync group sheds every VIP, and the peer takes over. It exercises the same path
a real WAN loss takes rather than a special case, and it lives in /run so a
reboot cannot leave a router permanently ineligible.
Proven end to end in labsim: lever -> mastership moves -> WAN follows -> the old
master releases -> a LAN VM has internet -> the faulted router returns to BACKUP
and is eligible again.
Getting there exposed four real bugs, two of which would have broken a GENUINE
failover, not just the drill:
- The grace stamp was written only by the 30s reconciler, so a freshly
promoted master reached the 5s health check with no stamp, scored grace = 0,
failed instantly and went FAULT. With the peer already faulted that left
BOTH routers in FAULT and the LAN with no gateway at all -- worse than the
outage the check exists to prevent. The check now stamps on promotion.
- And it inherited STALE stamps from an earlier mastership, failing ~5s after
passing. The stamp is now cleared on the way down, by the health check
itself, not only by the reconciler.
- The lock fd leaked into VyOS's config session: `exec 9>` is inherited by the
long-lived unionfs-fuse the session spawns, which never closes it. From the
first config change on, every later reconciler run lost the flock and exited
0 having done nothing -- healthy-looking journal, silently stopped
reconciling. That is how a demoted router kept the WAN. Children now get 9>&-.
- vrrp-wan-apply touched pppoe0 unconditionally. On a box where pppoe0 has no
source-interface VyOS rejects the whole commit ("Physical source-interface
required"), taking the bond0.53 change down with it -- and the script still
returned 0, so the reconciler logged a release that never happened. pppoe0 is
now guarded on existence and the commit's verdict is propagated.
Still NOT applied to production. The pair is single-homed on WAN until it is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 23:27:17 +01:00
|
|
|
if [ -z "$(ip -4 -o addr show 2>/dev/null | grep " ${VIP}/")" ]; then
|
|
|
|
|
# Clear the grace stamp on the way down, HERE, not only in the reconciler.
|
|
|
|
|
# The reconciler runs every 30s; this runs every 5s. A promotion that
|
|
|
|
|
# inherited a stamp from an earlier mastership scored grace = hours, failed
|
|
|
|
|
# immediately, and took the sync group to FAULT ~5s after passing -- with the
|
|
|
|
|
# peer already faulted, that left BOTH routers in FAULT and the LAN with no
|
|
|
|
|
# gateway. The stamp must belong to the CURRENT mastership or it is worse
|
|
|
|
|
# than useless.
|
|
|
|
|
rm -f "$STATE/since" 2>/dev/null
|
|
|
|
|
exit 0
|
|
|
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Start the grace clock HERE, the moment mastership is first observed.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# It used to be stamped only by vrrp-wan-reconcile, which runs on a 30s timer --
|
|
|
|
|
# so a freshly promoted master reached this check with no stamp, scored grace=0,
|
|
|
|
|
# failed, and went FAULT before it had any chance to bring the WAN up. The peer
|
|
|
|
|
# then found itself alone with no WAN either and did the same. Observed in
|
|
|
|
|
# labsim: BOTH routers in FAULT, nobody holding the VIPs, the LAN with no
|
|
|
|
|
# gateway at all. That is worse than the outage this script exists to prevent,
|
|
|
|
|
# and it would have hit a REAL failover, not just a drill -- the health check
|
|
|
|
|
# runs every 5s and the reconciler had not yet ticked.
|
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p "$STATE" 2>/dev/null
|
|
|
|
|
[ -f "$STATE/since" ] || date +%s > "$STATE/since"
|
vyos: WAN follows VRRP mastership, rehearsed in labsim
The ISP is consumer with one static IP, so "both routers hold WAN" is not
available: the 10 gig lease is anchored to a cloned MAC and the PPPoE line to a
single credential. The WAN therefore has to move with mastership.
Proven end to end in the sim: the secondary was promoted, took the WAN, got a
lease, installed a default route, and a LAN VM reached the internet through it
(3/3, 9ms). Demoting released it -- link down, no address. Rebooting the master
converged correctly too: it came back BACKUP with the WAN disabled while the
peer kept it.
The rehearsal earned its keep four times over, and none of these were visible
from reading the docs:
- `transition-script` alone is NOT safe to hang internet on. VyOS delivers it
through keepalived-fifo.py, and on one promotion that helper logged NOTHING
while Keepalived_vrrp logged all six instances entering MASTER and the
built-in notify_master for conntrack-sync ran normally. The result was a
router holding every VIP with no WAN -- the 2026-09-02 outage, recreated by
the mechanism meant to prevent it. Hence vrrp-wan-reconcile on a 30s timer:
the scripts give speed, the timer gives correctness.
- The health check must ask REALITY, not a marker. Keying "am I master" on a
/run file written by the transition script meant that when the script did
not run, the router believed it was backup, passed the check, and kept the
VIPs it could not serve. It now asks whether the VIP is actually on the box.
- The old address-based check DEADLOCKED this design: may-I-be-master required
already having WAN, and only the master gets WAN. That is why vyos002 sat in
FAULT for ever -- the safety check had silently removed the redundancy it
existed to protect.
- script-template must be the FIRST thing a script does. Sourced after an if,
an exec and a mkdir it terminated the script inside the source, rc=0, no
output: the reconciler reported success having done nothing. Hence the split
into vrrp-wan-apply, matching the shape /config/vyos-known-good already uses.
Two hazards found and handled rather than discovered in production:
- A `configure` session whose process dies leaks a unionfs mount under
/opt/vyatta/config/tmp, and one of those holds the commit lock -- after
which every commit fails, including the manual one you try to fix it with.
A 30s job that can leak one per failure wedges the box on its own, so the
reconciler reaps dead sessions before it starts. It cleared 8 on the sim.
- Any `save` while a box is master persists the enabled WAN into config.boot,
so a reboot would claim the shared MAC regardless of VRRP state. Observed:
an ordinary console-apply did exactly this. config.boot must keep `disable`
on BOTH routers; the model asserts it and vyos:verify reports it as drift.
NOT yet applied to production, and it should not be until the remaining item is
settled: a clean, deliberately-triggered failover has been seen via reboot, but
`restart vrrp` twice failed to move mastership at all, so the trigger for a
planned failover is still unproven.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 18:02:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Master with an address on a WAN interface: healthy.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Deliberately NOT "can I reach the internet" and NOT "do I have a default
|
|
|
|
|
# route". During a real ISP outage the route disappears on BOTH routers; a check
|
|
|
|
|
# keyed on that would put both into FAULT, nobody would hold the VIPs, and the
|
|
|
|
|
# LAN would lose inter-VLAN routing too -- turning an internet outage into a
|
|
|
|
|
# total one. A DHCP lease survives an ISP outage, so an address still
|
|
|
|
|
# distinguishes "this box structurally cannot route" from "the internet is down
|
|
|
|
|
# right now", which is the distinction that matters.
|
vyos: VRRP health check so the WAN and the gateway VIP cannot separate
Outage of 2026-09-02: vyos002 held every floating gateway IP while vyos001 held
the only working WAN. The LAN had a gateway that could not reach the internet,
and it stayed that way until vyos002 was powered off by hand.
Three causes, none of them bad luck. VRRP had no health check of any kind, so
mastership was decided purely on whether the peer was still advertising and
never on whether this router could route. vyos002 structurally cannot route --
bond0.53 is `disable`d because the 10 gig lease is bound to a cloned MAC that
only one box may hold, and pppoe0 is not up. And `no-preempt` is set on every
group, so once vyos002 took master it kept it even with a healthy priority-200
peer sitting next to it.
Reproduced exactly in labsim: stopping keepalived on the primary moved every VIP
to the WAN-less secondary and LAN internet went from 9ms to 100% loss; restarting
the healthy primary left it BACKUP and the outage in place. Applying this check
self-healed it -- secondary to FAULT, primary to MASTER, internet back.
The check asks "do I have an address on a WAN interface", deliberately not "can
I reach the internet" and not "do I have a default route". During a real ISP
outage the default route disappears on BOTH routers; keying on that would put
both in FAULT, nobody would hold the VIPs, and an internet outage would become a
total one.
Config goes on the SYNC GROUP, not per group: VyOS refuses a per-group check
while the group is in a sync group ("Only sync group health check will be
used"), and sync-group scope is what we want anyway so all VIPs move together.
Known cost, measured: with the primary genuinely dead the secondary stays FAULT
and NOTHING holds the gateway, so inter-VLAN routing stops too. That is the
honest consequence of a backup that cannot route. The fix for it is to make the
WAN follow mastership so the backup CAN route -- next, and rehearsed separately,
since it is the one change that can lose the DHCP lease.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 11:39:44 +01:00
|
|
|
for ifc in bond0.53 pppoe0; do
|
|
|
|
|
ip -4 addr show dev "$ifc" 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet ' && exit 0
|
|
|
|
|
done
|
vyos: WAN follows VRRP mastership, rehearsed in labsim
The ISP is consumer with one static IP, so "both routers hold WAN" is not
available: the 10 gig lease is anchored to a cloned MAC and the PPPoE line to a
single credential. The WAN therefore has to move with mastership.
Proven end to end in the sim: the secondary was promoted, took the WAN, got a
lease, installed a default route, and a LAN VM reached the internet through it
(3/3, 9ms). Demoting released it -- link down, no address. Rebooting the master
converged correctly too: it came back BACKUP with the WAN disabled while the
peer kept it.
The rehearsal earned its keep four times over, and none of these were visible
from reading the docs:
- `transition-script` alone is NOT safe to hang internet on. VyOS delivers it
through keepalived-fifo.py, and on one promotion that helper logged NOTHING
while Keepalived_vrrp logged all six instances entering MASTER and the
built-in notify_master for conntrack-sync ran normally. The result was a
router holding every VIP with no WAN -- the 2026-09-02 outage, recreated by
the mechanism meant to prevent it. Hence vrrp-wan-reconcile on a 30s timer:
the scripts give speed, the timer gives correctness.
- The health check must ask REALITY, not a marker. Keying "am I master" on a
/run file written by the transition script meant that when the script did
not run, the router believed it was backup, passed the check, and kept the
VIPs it could not serve. It now asks whether the VIP is actually on the box.
- The old address-based check DEADLOCKED this design: may-I-be-master required
already having WAN, and only the master gets WAN. That is why vyos002 sat in
FAULT for ever -- the safety check had silently removed the redundancy it
existed to protect.
- script-template must be the FIRST thing a script does. Sourced after an if,
an exec and a mkdir it terminated the script inside the source, rc=0, no
output: the reconciler reported success having done nothing. Hence the split
into vrrp-wan-apply, matching the shape /config/vyos-known-good already uses.
Two hazards found and handled rather than discovered in production:
- A `configure` session whose process dies leaks a unionfs mount under
/opt/vyatta/config/tmp, and one of those holds the commit lock -- after
which every commit fails, including the manual one you try to fix it with.
A 30s job that can leak one per failure wedges the box on its own, so the
reconciler reaps dead sessions before it starts. It cleared 8 on the sim.
- Any `save` while a box is master persists the enabled WAN into config.boot,
so a reboot would claim the shared MAC regardless of VRRP state. Observed:
an ordinary console-apply did exactly this. config.boot must keep `disable`
on BOTH routers; the model asserts it and vyos:verify reports it as drift.
NOT yet applied to production, and it should not be until the remaining item is
settled: a clean, deliberately-triggered failover has been seen via reboot, but
`restart vrrp` twice failed to move mastership at all, so the trigger for a
planned failover is still unproven.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 18:02:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Master, no WAN yet, still within the grace window: DHCP negotiation and PPPoE
|
|
|
|
|
# dial-up take real time, and the ISP has to accept the cloned MAC arriving on a
|
|
|
|
|
# different port. Failing here would demote the new master before it ever had a
|
|
|
|
|
# chance, and hand the VIPs straight back -- a flap, not a failover.
|
|
|
|
|
since=$(cat "$STATE/since" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
|
|
|
|
|
[ $(( $(date +%s) - since )) -lt "$GRACE" ] && exit 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Master, past grace, still no WAN: release. This is the 2026-09-02 case.
|
vyos: VRRP health check so the WAN and the gateway VIP cannot separate
Outage of 2026-09-02: vyos002 held every floating gateway IP while vyos001 held
the only working WAN. The LAN had a gateway that could not reach the internet,
and it stayed that way until vyos002 was powered off by hand.
Three causes, none of them bad luck. VRRP had no health check of any kind, so
mastership was decided purely on whether the peer was still advertising and
never on whether this router could route. vyos002 structurally cannot route --
bond0.53 is `disable`d because the 10 gig lease is bound to a cloned MAC that
only one box may hold, and pppoe0 is not up. And `no-preempt` is set on every
group, so once vyos002 took master it kept it even with a healthy priority-200
peer sitting next to it.
Reproduced exactly in labsim: stopping keepalived on the primary moved every VIP
to the WAN-less secondary and LAN internet went from 9ms to 100% loss; restarting
the healthy primary left it BACKUP and the outage in place. Applying this check
self-healed it -- secondary to FAULT, primary to MASTER, internet back.
The check asks "do I have an address on a WAN interface", deliberately not "can
I reach the internet" and not "do I have a default route". During a real ISP
outage the default route disappears on BOTH routers; keying on that would put
both in FAULT, nobody would hold the VIPs, and an internet outage would become a
total one.
Config goes on the SYNC GROUP, not per group: VyOS refuses a per-group check
while the group is in a sync group ("Only sync group health check will be
used"), and sync-group scope is what we want anyway so all VIPs move together.
Known cost, measured: with the primary genuinely dead the secondary stays FAULT
and NOTHING holds the gateway, so inter-VLAN routing stops too. That is the
honest consequence of a backup that cannot route. The fix for it is to make the
WAN follow mastership so the backup CAN route -- next, and rehearsed separately,
since it is the one change that can lose the DHCP lease.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DMVzWZgiKW2wquf5z8S1yH
2026-09-02 11:39:44 +01:00
|
|
|
exit 1
|